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FROM THE BORDER TO THE SCHOOLHOUSE
GATE: ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENTS FOR
EXTENDING PRIMARY EDUCATION TO
UNDOCUMENTED ALIEN CHILDREN
Maria Pab6n L6pez*
Diomedes J. Tsitouras**

I.

INTRODUCTION

The current legal and political landscape in the United States
reveals the challenges posed by the broken immigration system and its
concomitant result, the high levels of unauthorized or undocumented
migration to the country. While many local civic institutions are
impacted daily by unauthorized immigration, statewide educational
systems in particular have found themselves squarely in the fray on this
matter. Whether children lacking legal immigration status, typically
denominated undocumented students, are able to attend public primary
school gratis has been a settled question for the last twenty-five years. In
1982, the Supreme Court held in its landmark decision Plyler v. Doe that
undocumented students cannot be deprived by a state of a free public K12 education without violating the Equal Protection Clause.' Thus, it has
been the law of the land since then that these children have been able to
access primary education.
Since then, attempts have been made to pass legislation that would
overrule the decision. For instance, at the federal level, the Gallegly
amendments proposed in 1995 and 1996 would have removed states'
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Law, Indiana University School of Law, Indianapolis. The research assistance of Miriam Murphy,
Associate Director, Ruth Lilly Law Library, Indiana University School of Law, Indianapolis and of
Donna Johnsen Close is greatly appreciated.
** B.S. Cornell University School of Labor Relations, M.P.A. Cornell Institute for Public
Affairs, J.D. 2009 (expected) Indiana University School of Law, Indianapolis.
I. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,210, 221-22, 230 (1982).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2008

1

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 4 [2008], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:1243

obligation to educate undocumented children.2 In 1994, California voters
approved Proposition 187, the "Save our State" initiative, which
required school districts to notify federal immigration authorities of
children who were unable to verify their immigration status. 3 Parts of the
provision were ruled unconstitutional, as they were in conflict with
Plyler.4
While the Court decided Plyler on Federal Equal Protection
grounds, this Article identifies alternative sources of law, both in state
constitutions and at the federal level as well, that secure the right to
access education for undocumented children. Specifically, a large
number of state constitutions have both equal protection clauses and
education clauses, which can be used to secure this right. Further, the
Supreme Court has found that the right to parent is a fundamental one.
Thus, this right should also be used as an alternative federal
constitutional argument to secure the ability to access education.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I identifies the challenges,
present and future, to the Supreme Court's decision in Plyler. These
challenges have come in the form of proposed federal amendments. Part
II analyzes the right to parent under the federal law which has been
identified by the United States Supreme Court as existing under the
United States Constitution. We contend that such right extends to
undocumented fathers and mothers present here in the United States.
This Part further explores legal and policy aspects to the management of
the right to parent, including the potential for immigrant voting in local
elections. This Part also considers the consequences of the use of the
right to parent for undocumented parents to access free public education
for their undocumented children. Part III analyzes the rights of
undocumented children under the equal protection clauses of both the
United States and Texas Constitutions. This Part also hazards a
prediction regarding the current Supreme Court and how it might rule on
the Federal Equal Protection arguments as litigated in Plyler. Finally,
Part IV concludes that while Plyler has been criticized doctrinally, it
should also be seen as a decision that could stand on alternative
constitutional bases in order to allow undocumented students access to a

2. Maria Pab6n L6pez, Reflections On Educating Latino and Latina Undocumented
Children: Beyond Plyler v. Doe, 35 SETON HALL L. REv. 1373, 1395-96 (2005) (citing H.R. 4134,
104th Cong. (1996)). The amendments did not pass. See id.
3. See id. at 1396-97; see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp.
755, 763-65 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
4. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 786 & n.38, 787.
5. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).
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free primary education. Rather than taking a narrow view of the border
meeting the schoolhouse gate, and in order to afford undocumented
students the opportunity for a free public education, this Article proposes
a more expansive view, where the whole of the educational and
parenting experience should be considered in determining the contours
of the rights for undocumented students and their parents.
II.

CHALLENGES TO PLYLER V. DOE

While Plyler v. Doe represents a high water mark in immigrants'
rights jurisprudence, it has suffered criticism and challenges. The Plyler
opinion, decided by a close 5-4 vote, was criticized at the time as being
"result-oriented, '' 6 and because it "appear[ed] to be ad hoc and divorced
from other related bodies of law created by the Court."7 The challenges
then to the holding of Plyler have been found in the legislative realm. At
the federal level, California Congressman Elton Gallegly introduced an
addition to the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Responsibility Act
("IIRARA"). s Title VI of the amendment reads:
(a) Statement of Policy.-Because Congress views that the right to a
free public education for aliens who are not lawfully present in the
United States promotes violations of the immigration laws and because
such a free public education for such aliens creates a significant burden
on States' economies and depletes States' limited educational
resources, Congress declares it to be the policy of the United States
that-(1) aliens who are not lawfully present in the United States are
not entitled to public education benefits in the same manner as United
States citizens, nationals, and lawful resident aliens; and (2) States
should not be obligated to provide public education benefits to aliens
who are not lawfully present in the United States.
(b) Construction.-Nothing in this section shall be construed as
expressing any statement of Federal policy with regard to-(1) aliens
who are lawfully present in the United States, (2) benefits other than
public education benefits provided under State law, or (3) preventing

6. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 244 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
7. Philip B. Kurland & Dennis J. Hutchinson, The Business of the Supreme Court, 0. T.
1982, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 628, 650 (1983). In fact, Professor Hutchinson took his critique further,
stating that "Plyler cut a remarkably messy path through other areas of the Court's jurisprudence."
Dennis J. Hutchinson, More Substantive Equal Protection?A Note on Plyler v. Doe, 1982 SUP. CT.
REV. 167, 184 (1982).
8. L6pez, supra note 2, at 1396.
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or deportation of aliens unlawfully present in the United
the exclusion
9
States.
The amendment "would have allowed states to regulate for
themselves the conditions under which undocumented children" could
access public schools.10 Thus, a state could even ban such children from
its schools. The House of Representatives approved IIRARA, including
the Gallegly amendment."' When President Clinton threatened a veto, it
was dropped from the Act. 12 There was also opposition by Texas
Senators Kay Bailey Hutchison and Phil Gramm, and a publicity
campaign by public interest groups, both of which led to the dissolution
of the amendment. 13 While such a provision may appear to be less likely
today, with Congress in Democratic control and at least some
Republican support for more immigrant-friendly reforms, it is a fact that
14
immigration is even more a "hot" issue than it was eleven years ago.
Immigration has grown more in the last seven years than at any other
time in United States' history. 15 Federal legislation such as this one
could resurface at any time, thus making it analytically useful to explore
alternative grounds for undocumented students to have access to free
public education in the United States.

III.

AN UNDOCUMENTED ALIEN'S RIGHT TO PARENT

A.

Early Origins of the Right to Parent

The Supreme Court reasoned in Plyler that it would be unfair to
punish children for the illegal acts of their parents. 16 This argument was
adopted from earlier illegitimacy cases. Justice Powell made this clear in
his concurring opinion:
9. H.R. 4134, 104th Cong. § 1 (1996). The amendment was also introduced in 1995. H.R.
1377, 104th Cong. (1995).
10. Jaclyn Brickman, Note, Educating Undocumented Children in the United States:
CodificationofPlyler v. Doe Through FederalLegislation, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 385, 391 (2006).
I1. Id.
12. Id.
13. L6pez, supra note 2, at 1396 (citing Sidney Weintraub et al., Responses to Mitigation
Issues, in U.S. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, MEXICO-U.S. BINATIONAL MIGRATION STUDY

REPORT 437,
5weintraub.pdf).
14.

468

(1997),

available

at

http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/uscir/binpapers/v1

-

See Julia Preston, Immigration is Defying Easy Answers, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 30, 2007, at

A17.
15. Julia Preston, 7-Year Immigration Rate is Highest in U.S. History, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29,
2007, at A20.
16. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982).
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Although the analogy is not perfect, our holding today does find
support in decisions of this Court with respect to the status of
illegitimates. In Weber v. [sic] Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., we said:
"[V]isiting ...condemnation on the head of an infant" for the
misdeeds of the parents is illogical, unjust, and "contrary to the basic
concept of our system that legal burdens should
bear some relationship
17
to individual responsibility or wrongdoing."
Plyler is driven considerably by the public policy reason of

society's interest in educating children as well as notions of equal
protection. 18 However, alternative grounds for the continued access of
education to undocumented children exist. Although children have no

right to education in the Federal Constitution, there is a "fundamental
interest of parents, as contrasted with that of the State, to guide the
religious future and education of their children."' 9 Thus, parents have a
right to direct the education of their children free from unreasonable
state mandates. This right is focused on the parent's choice, rather than
the children's right to education.
Further, aliens ° are "persons" within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution. 21 Thus, because the right to parent is
largely derived from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it can be said to apply to undocumented aliens.
Meyer v. Nebraska is the first case where the right to parent was
expressed by the Supreme Court.22 In Meyer, the Nebraska legislature
had enacted a law which prohibited the teaching of foreign language
below the eighth grade. 23 In the wake of post-World War I nativism,
twenty-two other states also passed such laws.24 The purpose of the law,
17. Id. at 238 (Powell, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted).
18. Id. at221-22.
19. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-35 (1972) (holding that the State could not
compel Amish children to attend school beyond eighth grade in contradiction to their parents'
wishes).
20. "Alien" is the term in the Immigration and Nationality Act for "any person not a citizen or
national of the United States." Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § I101(a)(3) (2000). It is
used in this Article interchangeably with "noncitizen," another term with the same meaning.
21. Plyler,457U.S.at212.
In concluding that "all persons within the territory of the United States," including aliens
unlawfully present, may invoke the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to challenge actions of
the Federal Government, we reasoned from the understanding that the Fourteenth
Amendment was designed to afford its protection to all within the boundaries of a State.
Id. (citing Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896)).
22. 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923).
23. Id. at 397.
24. See William G. Ross, A JudicialJanus: Meyer v. Nebraska in HistoricalPerspective, 57
U. CIN. L. REv. 125, 133 (1988).
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according to Nebraska's attorney general at the time, was "to create an
enlightened American citizenship in sympathy with the principles and
ideals of this country, and to prevent children reared in America from
being trained and educated in foreign languages and foreign ideals
before they have had an opportunity to learn the English
language ....,25

The Court held that the Nebraska statute violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 6 The Court stated that,
"[c]orresponding to the right of control, it is the natural duty of the
parent to give his children education suitable to their station in life; and
nearly all the States, including Nebraska, enforce this obligation by
compulsory laws."2 7 Thus, the right to parent includes the ability to
direct the education of the child. Prohibiting foreign language instruction
interferes with this duty. An additional basis for the holding in Meyer
was that the law interfered with the right of teachers "to pursue their
vocations" on a freedom of contract theory.28 This basis was
subsequently overruled.29
The right to parent was reaffirmed in the case of Pierce v. Society of
Sisters.3 ° In this case, the Supreme Court enjoined the enforcement of
Oregon's Compulsory Education Act of 1922.31 The Act required every
parent to send any child between the ages of eight and sixteen to public
school.32 The Society of Sisters operated many private primary and
secondary schools.33 Parents, as a result of the Act, withdrew their
34
children from the private schools operated by the Society of Sisters.
The Society of Sisters brought suit seeking an injunction and claimed
that the Act interfered with "the right of parents to choose schools where
their children will receive appropriate mental and religious
training .. .

The Court relied on its precedent of the Meyer v. Nebraska case,
and stated that the Act "unreasonably interferes with the liberty of
25. Brief and Argument of State of Nebraska, Defendant in Error at 12-13, Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (No. 325).

26. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399, 402.
27. Id. at 400.
28. See id. at 393, 399.
29. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (holding there is no due
process freedom of contract claim, so long as the regulation is reasonably related).
30.

268 U.S. 510(1925).

31. Id. at 534-36.
32. Id. at 530.
33.

Id. at 531-32.

34. Id. at 532.
35.

Id.
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parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control.,

36

It further stated that "[t]he child is not the mere

creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have
the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations. 37
As the original right to parent case, the Plyler Court relied on
Meyer in explaining that while there is no federal constitutional right to
education, it is not any ordinary governmental benefit:
Public education is not a "right" granted to individuals by the
Constitution. But neither is it merely some governmental "benefit"
indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation. Both
the importance of education in maintaining our basic institutions, and
the lasting impact of its deprivation on the life of the child, mark the
distinction. The "American people have always regarded education and
[the] acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance," We
have recognized "the public schools as a most vital civic institution for
the preservation of a democratic system of government .... ,38

Thus, while education is not a fundamental right, its paramount
importance suggests that parents retain some degree of control and do
not abdicate all responsibility to the state. By excluding undocumented
children from primary education, parents would be deprived of the
ability to give their children the benefits of America's "most vital civic
institution., 39 Not merely the prohibition of teaching a foreign language
would be at stake, but most likely the ability to learn any language or
any academic subject at all.
Several decades later in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court
elaborated on the natural duty a parent has to educate a child.40 It
explained that "[t]he duty to prepare the child for 'additional
obligations,' referred to by the Court, must be read to include the
inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good
citizenship. 41 While the last obligation, that of "good citizenship,"
would not apply to an alien, there is nothing in the Court's opinion to
suggest that this is the only public policy justification for compulsory

36. Id. at 534-35.
37. Id. at 535.
38.

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982)

(citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963);
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
39. Id.
40. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-33 (1972).
41. Id. at 233.
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education. Further, such an obligation may be a means to better integrate
noncitizens into the national community and prepare them for our
country's ultimate form of participation: citizenship.
When decisions of the parent will "jeopardize the health or safety
of the child, or have a potential for significant social burdens" the
obligation and right of the parent is limited.42 In Yoder, the Court held
that the State of Wisconsin breached the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment when it required Amish parents to comply with a
compulsory attendance law.43 Amish parents claimed that their religion
expressly prohibited secondary education.44 The Court ruled that the
State's interest in compulsory education must be balanced with the
interests of the free exercise of religion.45
Some state courts have narrowed the application of the right to
parent in terms of the ability to direct a child's education, by limiting
that right to cases that concern a religious conflict with the parent's
religious beliefs. For example, the Michigan Supreme Court held that
there was no fundamental right to parent under the Fourteenth
Amendment in the case of Michigan v. Bennett.46 In addition, it narrowly
read Pierce and Yoder as only having application in a religious context.47
As a result, the court upheld a statute which required certification for
those parents who teach their children at home.4 8
Finally, the Supreme Court has recently clarified the fundamental
right to parent in Troxel v. Granville.49 It stated, "we have recognized the
fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care,
custody, and control of their children. 5 ° In Troxel, the Court struck
down a Washington statute that allowed child visitation for "[a]ny
person" at "any time.", 5' The grandparents of two children petitioned the
Washington Superior Court for increased visitation with their
grandchildren.52 Over the mother's objections, the court granted the
order.53 The Washington Supreme Court reversed the order because it
was an unconstitutional infringement on the mother's care, custody, and
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 233-34.
Id. at 234-36.
Id. at 215-18.
Id. at 215.
501 N.W.2d 106, 108 (Mich. 1993).
Id. at 112-13.
Id. at 120.
530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000).
Id. at 66.
Id. at 61, 75.
Id. at 61.
Id.
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control of her children. 4 The United States Supreme Court ruled the
visitation statute violated the. right to parent and was not in the best
interest of the child.55 This was based on the presumption that fit parents
act in the best interest of their children and should be able to determine
with whom they associate.56
While the Court found a right in this circumstance, it is not clear
precisely where the limits of parents' rights lie. Courts have been
reluctant to give parents authority in curriculum decisions. For example,
courts have rejected parental rights with respect to objection to
compulsory community service, academic testing, and mandatory sex
education.57
B. Other ConstitutionalGrounds:
Ninth Amendment, NaturalLaw, and OriginalIntent
All cases so far have viewed the right to parent via the Fourteenth
Amendment. However, the right to parent may also derive from the
Ninth Amendment. 58 The Ninth Amendment instructs, "[t]he
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people."5 9 The Ninth
Amendment implies rights that are not explicitly spelled out in the
Constitution. 60 Even in Troxel, in his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia
stated that the Ninth Amendment is a better fit for protecting the right to
parent than the Fourteenth Amendment using similar reasoning.61

54.

Id.at 63.

55. Id. at 72-73.
56. Id. at 68-69.
57. Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 461-62 (2d Cir. 1996); Hubbard v.
Buffalo Indep. Sch. Dist., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1014-17 (W.D. Tex. 1998); Cornwell v. State Bd. of
Educ., 314 F. Supp. 340, 341, 344 (D. Md. 1969), affd, 428 F.2d 471, 472 (4th Cir. 1970) (per

curiam).
58. See Daniel E. Witte, Comment, People v. Bennett: Analytic Approaches to Recognizing a
FundamentalParentalRight Under the Ninth Amendment, 1996 BYU L. REV. 183, 210.

59.

U.S. CONST. amend. IX.

60. Howard J. Vogel, The "Ordered Liberty " of Substantive Due Process and the Future of
ConstitutionalLaw as a RhetoricalArt: Variations on a Theme From Justice Cardozo in the United
States Supreme Court, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1473, 1477 (2006).

61.

Troxel, 530 U.S. at 91 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

In my view, a fight of parents to direct the upbringing of their children is among the
"unalienable Rights" with which the Declaration of Independence proclaims "all

Men ...are endowed by their Creator." And in my view that right is also among the
"othe[r]

[rights]

retained by the people" which the Ninth Amendment says the

Constitution's enumeration of rights "shall not be construed to deny or disparage."
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Usually, these rights are articulated by means of natural law theory
or original intent.62 Natural law theory suggests that these are rights that
are "unalienable Rights," arising from the laws of nature.6 3 These have
included life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. 64 The Supreme Court
has expressed this notion in terms of natural law theory: "The [Supreme]
Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the family. The
rights to conceive and raise one's children have been deemed 'essential,'
'basic civil rights of man,' and '[r]ights far more precious ... than
property rights."' 65 The child's "favored, beneficent status in our social
and legal systems does not detract from the well-settled rule that the
right of parents to the custody of minor children is both a natural and a
legal right., 66 Thus, because the right to parent is one that is unalienable,
it can be implied to exist under the Ninth Amendment.
However, there may be a slight complication in applying the Ninth
Amendment to undocumented aliens because the Supreme Court has
ruled that they cannot be considered "people" unless they have a
"sufficient connection" to the United States. 67 This holding pertains to
undocumented persons under the Fourth Amendment, 68 but since both
amendments use the term "people," it may be found by implication
applicable to the Ninth Amendment. Thus, it is not entirely clear
whether an alien who voluntarily enters the country, maintains a job or
home, pays taxes, and builds credit would have a "sufficient connection"
with the United States. While the United States Supreme Court has not
ruled on this topic, lower court cases have held that lawful border
crossings and legal entry could constitute voluntary acceptance of
societal obligations, and thus a sufficient connection to the national
community. 69 Further, even an unlawful status in the United States may
meet this standard. y

62.
63.
64.
65.

Witte, supra note 58, at 210.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 212 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)) (alterations in original).

66.

Ariz. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Barlow, 296 P.2d 298, 300 (Ariz. 1956).

67. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990).
68. Id. at 261.
69. See Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 625 (5th Cir. 2006) ("regular and lawful
entry of the United States pursuant to a valid border-crossing card and her acquiescence in the U.S.
system of immigration constitute her voluntary acceptance of societal obligations .... "); United
States v. Tehrani, 826 F. Supp. 789, 794 n.1 (D. Vt. 1993) (finding that temporary tourist visas
qualified as a substantial connection).
70. United States v. Atienzo, No. 2:04-CR-00534(PGC), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31652, at
*14-15 (D. Utah Dec. 6, 2005) (granting a motion to suppress after holding that undocumented
status alone constituted "sufficient connections" with the United States and thus Fourth Amendment
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The right to parent can also be considered to be a right the founders
contemplated when they wrote the Constitution. The United States
Supreme Court recognized such original intent in Yoder, stating that
"[the] primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is
now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition." 71 It
further noted, "Thomas Jefferson pointed out early in our history, that
some degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate
effectively and intelligently in our open political system if we are to
preserve freedom and independence., 72 This quote may also be
interpreted to apply to noncitizens because the distinctions between
citizen and noncitizen were small at the time. For example, the colonies
did not all follow the English tradition to exclude aliens from voting and
holding public office. 73 In addition, because it took nearly thirty years
for the new federal government to exercise its power to naturalize, many
noncitizens were allowed to vote at both local and national levels.74 Such
rights were granted on the basis of race and property ownership, rather
than citizenship. 5 Finally, early in United States history, notions of state
citizenship were more important than national citizenship.76
In addition, an original intent argument is evident in Meyer, where
the Supreme Court stated:
The Ordinance of 1787 declares, 'Religion, morality, and knowledge
being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind,
schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.'
Corresponding to the right of control, it is the natural duty of the parent
to give his children education suitable to their station in life; and nearly
all the States, 77including Nebraska, enforce this obligation by
compulsory laws.

Thus, the right to parent can be considered one that has been deeply
rooted in our history and tradition, and thus should be implied via the
Ninth Amendment.
protection could be applied). But see United States v. Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1254,

1271-74 (D. Utah 2003) (denying a motion to suppress after holding that a previously removed alien
felon did not have "sufficient connection" with the United States and thus could not receive Fourth

Amendment protection).
71.
72.
73.

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).
Id.at221.
Virginia Harper-Ho, Noncitizen Voting Rights: The History, the Law and Current
Prospects for Change, 18 LAW & INEQ. 271, 273 (2000).

74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 274.
Id. at 275.
Id. at 274.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
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C. The Right to Parentas an Alternative Basisfor Plyler
The right to parent, whether existing in the Ninth Amendment or
the Fourteenth Amendment, can be applied as an alternative basis for
holding that the children of undocumented aliens have a right to access
primary education.78 Supreme Court cases such as Pierce and Meyer
involved absolute educational restrictions: a prohibition on sending
children to private school, and the teaching of a foreign language in the
public school, respectively. Both cases were examples of unreasonable
interferences with the ability of parents to direct their children's
education. Further, if a state was to charge an undocumented alien parent
with an unaffordable amount of tuition, this would be an unreasonable
interference because it would be akin to requiring the child be sent to
private school or be home-schooled. In light of Pierce, a state law
forcing a child to go to private school should similarly be
unconstitutional because it would be directing his or her education in
contradiction with the parents' wishes.
And unlike Yoder, where Amish parents opted not to send their
children to school in contravention to the state interest of universal
education, undocumented parents choosing to send their child to public
school is consistent with such a state interest. In fact, Justice White's
concurring opinion in Yoder quoted the same language from Brown v.
Board of Education as the Plyler Court in acknowledging the
significance of education. 79 He acknowledged that "[t]oday, education is
perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for
education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of
education to our democratic society., 80 Thus, because the state's interest
furthers the parent's right to the education of his or her child, the state
interest and that of the parent should be one and the same. The interests
may only diverge over specific issues like bilingual education and other
special education. A school district may want to pursue an immersion
type education or cut back on existing resources targeted to

78. There is some disagreement as to whether a heightened form of scrutiny should always be
used with respect to parental rights and education. See Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d
454, 461 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying rational-basis review); see also Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer
Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 533 (1st Cir. 1995) ("[T]he Supreme Court has yet to decide whether the
right to direct the upbringing and education of one's children is among those fundamental rights
whose infringement merits heightened scrutiny.").
79. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 238 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
80. Id. (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)); see also Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 222-23 (1982) (same).
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undocumented students. A parent of an undocumented child would
usually want the opposite.
The right to parent is also beneficial in the reinforcement of
encouraging parents to be involved in their children's education. Studies
show that parental involvement increases the chance of strong academic
performance.81 Students with involved parents are more likely to get
higher grades, pass classes, have better social skills, and go on to
postsecondary education.82
D. Mechanismsfor Promotingthe Right to Parent
Extending the right to vote in school board elections is one method
to increase parental involvement of undocumented parents in public
schools. There are three reasons why extending such a parental right
would be a good policy: It would assist in assimilating new student
populations, provide more equity by requiring that all voices be heard,
and hold local school boards accountable for special student needs.
Allowing undocumented parents voting rights encourages the new
student assimilation. Such a right would be a first step in civic
participation, and it would symbolize the democratic freedom for which
the United States stands.83 In a more practical sense, it would encourage
undocumented persons to take part in their communities, and create a
sense of ownership that may not exist otherwise. Finally, the special
needs undocumented children have in terms of special education and
bilingual education/immersion programs would be better maintained
through advocacy at the school board level.
Equity requires that everyone's voice be heard. 84 Without a vehicle
to express their frustrations, people become disillusioned. Sometimes
this dissatisfaction grows into anger, divisiveness, and violence. The
recent riots in France involving immigrant youths are one such
example.85 It is estimated that in a lifetime an average undocumented
alien will pay "$80,000 more in taxes than [he or she] will receive in

81.

See ANNE T. HENDERSON & KAREN L. MAPP, NATIONAL CTR. FOR FAMILY AND CMTY.

CONNECTIONS WITH SCH., A NEW WAVE OF EVIDENCE: THE IMPACT OF SCHOOL, FAMILY, AND
CONNECTIONS
ON
STUDENT
ACHIEVEMENT
7 (2002), available at
http://www.sedl.org/connections/resources/evidence.pdf.
82. Id.
83. Bryant Yuan Fu Yang, Note, Fightingfor an Equal Voice: Past and PresentStrugglefor
Noncitizen Enfranchisement, 13 ASIAN AM. L.J. 57, 62 (2006).
84. Id. at 63.
85. Id. at 62.
COMMUNITY
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local, state, and federal benefits." 86 Hence, in order to avoid an unfair
taxation without representation, undocumented parents should have
limited right to vote in school board elections.
In addition, the right to access education can be more fully enjoyed
when those accessing education have a say in how it is administered.
School boards approve of new teachers, set policy, decide curriculum,
and appropriate money. 87 Courts routinely give deference to school
boards with respect to these decisions. 88 With local boards yielding so
much power, undocumented parents should be able to hold such power
accountable. Perhaps if undocumented parents could vote, they could
discourage school board members from ineffective measures such as
when the Anaheim School Board attempted to bill Mexico fifty million
dollars for the cost of educating its undocumented children.89
Despite being sound policy, extending the right to vote in school
board elections is unlikely to occur. There are those who fear that
allowing persons who are not citizens to take part in the duties of
citizenship devalues citizenship so that less potential applicants will be
likely to pursue a pathway to citizenship in the future. 90 Further, some
cities have experienced mixed results in extending the right to noncitizen
legal permanent residents ("LPRs"). Chicago extends this right to
noncitizen LPRs. 91 New York City provided the same right until 2002
when it abolished its school boards.92 San Francisco also attempted to
grant LPRs this right.93 However, voters rejected this proposal known as

OF

86. Id. at 63. (quoting STEPHEN MOORE, NAT'L IMMIGRATION FORUM, A FISCAL PORTRAIT
THE NEWEST AMERICANS 4 (1998), available at http://www.immigrationforum.org/

DesktopDefault.aspx?tabid=277).
87. See, e.g., Alief Independent School District, Understanding Your School Board,
http://www.alief.isd.tenet.edu/understand.htm (last visited June 29, 2008); Bryan Independent
School District Board Responsibilities, http://www.bryanisd.org/default.asp?pagelD=55 (last visited
June 29, 2008); District of Columbia School Board, http://www.dcwatch.com/archives/
election2000/survey03.htm (last visited June 29, 2008); Mercer Island School District, The
Responsibilities of School Boards, http://www.misd.kl2.wa.us/board/meminfo/role.html (last
visited June 29, 2008).
88. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 (1987) ("States and local school boards are
generally afforded considerable discretion in operating public schools.") (citing Bethel Sch. Dist.
No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (recognizing the autonomy of school boards in
regulating their schools)).
89. Lisa Richardson, High School District Mulls Suing Mexico; Restitution: ProposalUnder
Debate Would Demand $50 Million for Education of Mexican Children in Anaheim. Racism is
Charged,L.A. TIMES, May 28, 1999, at 11.

90.
91.
92.
93.

Yang, supra note 83, at 70-71.
Id at 60.
Id.
Id. at 58.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol36/iss4/4

14

López and Tsitouras: From the Border to the Schoolhouse Gate: Alternative Arguments fo
2008]

FROM THE BORDER TO THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE

"Proposition F" on November 2, 2004. In Maryland, the city of
Takoma Park allows noncitizens to vote in local elections, and in fact,
does not require proof of legal residence. 95 With the mixed record

regarding attempts to extend the right to vote for noncitizens, extending
such a right specifically to the undocumented would face an even greater
challenge.

Thus, because extending the right to vote is likely untenable,
schools should seek alternative forms of governance that allow for high
parental involvement, but also allow for undocumented parent inclusion.
One such alternative is a "school-based management initiative." 96 In this
form, decisions over budget, curriculum, and people are decided by a
council of parents, teachers, and administrators.97 Such a council would

be an excellent way to include undocumented parents because it is
possible to engineer such a body without an election.
E. Possible Negative Consequences of Expanding the Right to Parent

There are drawbacks to using the right to parent as a justification
for extending the access of primary education to undocumented children.
There is danger that by shifting the focus from the child to that of the

parent, the parent is not a suspect class and thus under equal protection
would receive only a lower level of scrutiny.98 Although some alienage

classifications are subject to strict scrutiny, undocumented persons'
unlawful entry is not a "constitutional irrelevancy," so they are not
considered a suspect class. 99
Another criticism when using the right to parent as means to justify
access to schooling is that a "privatization" of education would occur.' 00

94. Id.
95. Eunice Moscoso, In Maryland Town, Noncitizens Are Encouraged to Vote, DAYTON
DAILY NEWS, Nov. 8, 2007; see also Rachel L. Swarns, Immigrants Raise Call for Right to be
Voters, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2004, at AI3 (noting the "[e]fforts" of cities to "expand the franchise to
noncitizens"). See generally RON HADYUK, DEMOCRACY FOR ALL: RESTORING IMMIGRANT
VOTING RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES (2006) (discussing history and current trends in noncitizen
voting); Maia Pab6n L6pez, Noncitizens and the Franchise, in AMERICAN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CIVIL LIBERTIES (Paul Finkelman ed., 2006).
96. William G. Ross, The Contemporary Significance of Meyer and Pierce for Parental
Rights Issues Involving Education,34 AKRON L. REv. 177, 190 (2000).
97. Id.
98. Luke van Houwelingen, Note, Tuition-Based All-Day Kindergartens in the Public
Schools: A Moral and ConstitutionalCritique, 14 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 367, 380 (2007).
99. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 (1982).
100. Charles R. Lawrence Ill, Forbidden Conversations:On Race, Privacy, and Community (A
Continuing Conversation with John Ely on Racism and Democracy), 114 YALE L.J. 1353, 1356-57
(2005).
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This is because it suggests that parents have a greater choice of
schools. 10 1 Schemes that allow corporations to run schools, encourage
charter schools, and the extending of vouchers to parents, would all
favor the idea of a private notion of education as opposed to a public
one.
Parents would argue that if they have the right to send their children
to school, such a right should mean they are entitled to charter schools or
a voucher system. By channeling money away from public schools,
voucher systems and corporate-run schools harm public education. In the
long run, profit motives, combined with competitive forces, create
disparities within a single system in terms of quality. Such disparities
could then cause a separation between good and bad students, between
groups of parents, or even along race- or class-based lines. Parents
would retreat from certain schools and segregate themselves from
they view as unfavorable to their children's
certain populations
02
education.'
In addition, vouchers give rise to Establishment Clause issues, and
to the state's prohibition on funding sectarian schools.10 3 Parents using
the Meyer and Pierce cases to buttress an argument for school choice
based on the right to parent would also have to address the difference
between these cases and any voucher schemes. There is a large
distinction between a parent not wanting to send a child to public school
for religious reasons and the state declining to provide funds for children
to go to a nonpublic school. 10 4 Hence, school choice advocates cannot
derive the full benefit of parental rights.
Another negative consequence of enlarging parent control is that it
may give parents veto power over certain educational curricula and
programs. In the late 1990s, many grassroots religious organizations
0 5
lobbied state legislatures to pass "'Parental Rights Amendments.,,1'
These amendments sought to enhance the power of parents to be able to
choose the curricula and programs to which their children would be
exposed. 10 6 These initiatives are particularly favored by parents who
morally object to sexual education, evolution, and other curricula.'0 7 The
101.

Id.

102.
103.
104.

Id.
Ross, supra note 96, at 199-201.
Id. at 197.

105. Jennifer L. Sabourin, Note, Parental Rights Amendments: Will a Statutory Right to Parent
Force Children to "'Shed Their Constitutional Rights' at the Schoolhouse Door? ", 44 WAYNE L.
REV. 1899, 1899 (1999) (citation omitted).

106. Id. at 1900-02.
107. Id. at 1901-02.
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New York City School District's plan to distribute condoms, and other
attempts to teach students about sexual orientation with books such as
Heather Has Two Mommies' °8 and Daddy's Roommate, 1°9 caused an
uproar among these parents." 0 Most attempts at enacting such
legislation have failed. Congressional attempts at passing legislation
have also failed."11 In 1996, a Colorado initiative was defeated by a fiftytwo to forty-eight percentage vote." 2 Currently, Texas is the only state
to codify a right to parent;" 3 however, Hawaii, New York, Michigan,
and Arizona have recently considered parental rights bills in their
legislatures. 114
Parental Rights Amendments present many problems. Schools
would be on the defensive in deciding school curriculum, and teachers
might be forced to drop subjects they may have taught for years.' 5
Further, such a right would create more opportunities for litigation and
its resulting legal fees, which would be an additional expense for school
systems. 116 Finally, parental rights weaken the state's power to protect
children in child-abuse cases.' 7 However, while as a policy matter there
may be potential risks in the use of the right to parent, it is part of the
legal landscape in the United States and could serve as an alternative
ground for Plyler, as discussed above.
IV.

EQUAL PROTECTION AND UNDOCUMENTED ALIEN CHILDREN

Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Supreme Court has developed an analysis that scrutinizes state action
on three grounds, depending on the nature of the action. Under the
rational basis standard, a state action must bear a rational relationship to
108.
109.

LESLftA NEWMAN, HEATHER HAS Two MOMMIES (1989).
MICHAEL WILLHOITE, DADDY'S ROOMMATE (1990).

110. Sabourin, supra note 105, at 1906.
111. Parental Rights and Responsibilities Act of 1995, H.R. 1946, 104 Cong. (1995); see also
Sabourin, supra note 105, at 1900, 1901 n.14.
112. Ross, supra note 96, at 186.
113. Parents in Texas have the right to review all teaching materials used in the classroom, a
right to remove the child from lessons that are objectionable because of moral or religious reasons, a
right of prior consent before a child may be videotaped by a school employee, and the right to file a
grievance before the school board. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 26.001-011 (Vernon 2007); see also
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15 1.001 (Vernon 2007) (recognizing a parent's right to direct education).
114. S.B. 1392, 48th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. Feb. 4, 2008); H.R. 41, 24th Leg. (Haw. Jan.
17, 2008); S.R. 41, 24th Leg. (Haw. Feb. 25, 2008); H.J.R. 40, 94th Leg. (Mich. Jan. 23, 2008);
SB. 452, 230th Ann. Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2007).
115. See Ross, supra note 96, at 186-87.
116. Id. at 187.
117. Id.
at 186.
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a legitimate state interest in order to be constitutional."s Under
intermediate scrutiny, state action has to have a substantial relationship
to an important state interest.119 And under strict scrutiny, a state action
must further a compelling state interest that cannot be accomplished by
less intrusive means.1 20 A federal court will typically apply a rational
basis standard, unless a "heightened" form is necessary. A strict scrutiny
form is needed when a state action burdens a fundamental right.1 21 These
have included the right to interstate travel and the right to access the
courts, among others. 122 Strict scrutiny is employed when there is a
123 There are also quasisuspect classification, such as race or ethnicity.
24
suspect classifications, such as gender.'
The Court in Plyler used the rational basis standard, albeit "with a
bite."1 25 This was a function of a compromise.1 26 Justice Brennan, who

authored the majority opinion, used rational basis scrutiny "with a bite"
instead of strict scrutiny in order to attract Justice Powell's vote for the
majority.1 27 Justice Powell had written the decision in San Antonio
Independent School Districtv. Rodriguez and was a firm believer in its
holding that education was not a fundamental right. 128 The rest of the
majority consisted of Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. 129 Chief
Justice Burger filed a dissent, with Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, and
White joining.1 30 Today, Justice Stevens is the only remaining member
of the Court since 1982.

118. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973) (defining the
"traditional standard of review" as requiring a showing that the state system bears some "rational
relationship" to the state's goal).
119. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217, 218 & n.16 (1982).
120. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2751-52
(2007).
121. Randal S. Jeffrey, Equal Protection in State Courts: The New Economic Equality Rights,
17 LAW & INEQ. 239, 248 (1999); see also Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37 (rejecting lower court findings
that education is an appropriate issue for application of strict scrutiny review).
122. Jeffrey, supra note 121, at 248.
123. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
124. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
125. See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12
(1972).
126. See id. at 12, 46-47; Mark Tushnet, Justice Lewis F. Powell and the Jurisprudence of
Centrism, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1854, 1862-74 (1995).
127. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 203 (1973); see generally Tushnet, supra note 126, at 186274 (discussing the deliberations of the Plylerdecision).
128. 411 U.S. 1,2,38(1973).
129. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 203.
dissenting).
130. Id. at 242 (Burger, C.J.,
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If today's Court were deciding a similar provision to that which
was enacted by the Texas legislature in Plyler v. Doe, Justices like Alito,
Scalia, and Thomas would be likely to align with the dissenters in
Plyler. Justices Breyer and Ginsburg would likely side with the Plyler
majority. However, Chief Justice Roberts is more likely to lean towards
the dissent, based on the position he held while working
for the United
13 1
States Attorney General at the time Plyler was decided.
Further, it is possible that the Court may try to narrow the
applicability of the Equal Protection Clause. If a state interest is an
important one or satisfies the "rational basis with a bite" standard, a state
may be able to pass heightened scrutiny when excluding undocumented
children from a free public primary education. A state would have to
show that exclusion of such children may be the only way to fulfill such
interest.
The Plyler majority did not find that the cost of education was a
valid reason for denying undocumented children an education."' It
stated, "a concern for the preservation of resources standing alone can
hardly justify the classification used in allocating those resources. 13 3
Further, it noted, "[t]here is no evidence in the record suggesting that
illegal entrants impose any significant burden on the State's economy.
To the contrary, the available evidence suggests that illegal aliens
underutilize public services, while contributing their labor to the local
economy and tax money to the state fisc.' ' 134 The debate as to whether
undocumented aliens are a net gain or a net loss to the economy
continues raging today. 35 How in fact the undocumented children fare
with regard to using state educational resources may convince today's
Supreme Court that the state interest is important enough to warrant the
exclusion of undocumented children from public schools. Perhaps, a
state could show that circumstances have changed since 1982, by
drawing on twenty-five years of expenses related to educating an
increasingly greater population of undocumented children.
It is also possible that the holding in Plyler v. Doe may be limited
to its particular facts. One case illustrative of this notion is Kadrmas v.
131. See Memorandum from John Roberts and Carolyn Kuhl to the Attorney General, Plyler v.
Doe, "The
Texas
Illegal
Aliens
Case"
1-2
(June
15,
1982),
available at

http://www.archives.gov/news/john-roberts/accession-60-98-0832/036-chron-file-3-1-82-8-31

-

82/folder036.pdf (claiming that Justice Powell would have been on the side of the dissent if the
State of Texas had done more research on the "values ofjudicial restraint" in writing its brief).
132. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 227-28.
133. Id. at 227.
134. Id. at 228.
135. See Brickman, supra note 10, at 389.
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Dickinson Public Schools.136 In this case, a student challenged the
constitutionality of a North Dakota statute permitting school districts to
charge a user fee for bus transportation.' 37 The trial court dismissed the
suit and it was appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court.1 38 The
North Dakota Supreme Court ruled that the statute was a "'purely
economic' one and did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 139 The
United States Supreme Court agreed.140 It held that there was no need to
apply strict scrutiny to the statute because there was no fundamental
raising funds from fees was a
right nor suspect class present and that
41
scheme.'
statutory
the
for
rational basis
The Court declined to "extend the requirements of the Equal
Protection Clause beyond the limits recognized in our cases .... ,,4 The
of
plaintiffs relied on Plyler, and argued the same "heightened" form 143
review from that case should be applied to the North Dakota statute.
However, the Court was not persuaded, stating that "[w]e have not
extended this holding beyond the 'unique circumstances' that provoked
its 'unique confluence of theories and rationales.', 144 Further, the Court
distinguished Plyler from the facts before it, and stated "[u]nlike the
children in that case, Sarita Kadrmas has not been penalized by the
government for illegal conduct by her parents."' 145 Instead, the child was
denied education only because her parents refused to pay the same user
fee that all other families paid that accessed the service. 146 Further,
unlike the Plyler Court, the Kadrmas Court was not convinced that the
user fee would "'promote the creation and perpetuation of a subclass of
illiterates within our boundaries .... ,,,1 Thus, it is unclear whether
Plyler will be extended to any other educational cases.
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to extend the Equal
Protection Clause to protect many so-called economic rights claims, and
has declined to give heightened scrutiny to cases involving welfare,

136. 487 U.S. 450 (1988).
137. Id. at 455.
138. Id.
139. Id. (citing Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 402 N.W.2d 897, 902 (N.D. 1987)).
140.

Id.at 456.

141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.at457-58.
Id. at 458.
Id. at 459-60.
Id. at 459 (internal citations omitted).

145.

Id.

146.
147.

Id.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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housing, and education financing. 148 In the case of education financing,
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the Court held
that an equally funded education is not a fundamental right. 149 The Court
stated that there was no complete deprivation of education, and that
dictating to the legislature on how to fund its schools would cause
further harm. 150 For this reason, the Court used a rational basis form of
scrutiny and held that there was a legitimate state interest in the manner
in which the schools were funded. 151 As a result, many cases involving
economic rights, such as education, are often adjudicated on the state
level. 152 Thus, although under the United States Constitution education is
not a fundamental right, there are alternative avenues for this holding
under state constitutions.
Using State Constitutions

A.

State constitutions have two important clauses that may be used to
secure the right to access education for undocumented children. Fortynine states include constitutional articles establishing common public
school systems within their borders. 53 Only Iowa does not have a
constitutional clause or statute which provides for a unified public
school system. 154 Alabama has a constitutional provision which
establishes public schools but includes language preventing the
of the State's constitution as establishing a right to
interpretation
55
1
education.
When these state constitutional articles have been challenged, state
courts of last resort have upheld the constitutional language and
interpreted the constitutional clauses in support of education as a

148. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 44 (1973); Jefferson v. Hackney,
406 U.S. 535, 546-49 (1972); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74 (1972); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-87 (1970).
149. Rodriguez,411 U.S. at 37-38.
150. Id. at 37-38, 58.
151. Id. at 55.
152. See Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School FinanceReform, 48
VAND. L. REV. 101,105-10 (1995).

153. Memorandum of Donna Johnsen Close to Maria Pab6n L6pez, July 15, 2008 (on file with
authors). For a review of the historical dimensions of the state constitutions protection of public
education, see Stephen G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, IndividualRights Under State Constitutions
When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights are Deeply Rooted in
American History and Tradition? (Northwestern University School of Law Public Law and Legal

Theory Series, No. 08-06), TEXAS L. REv. (forthcoming).
154. IOWA CONST. art. IX, § 12.
155.

ALA.CONST. art. XIV,

§ 256.
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fundamental and inalienable right and applied the principle of equal
156
access for the state residents.
Courts in forty-eight states have interpreted their constitutions to
guarantee equal protection. 157 Twenty-one of these forty-eight states
provide greater equal protection than the Federal Constitution.1 58 The
other twenty-seven states have held their equal protection guarantee to
be equivalent to that of the Federal Constitution. 159 Certain states that
have provided greater protection than the Federal Constitution have
developed their own tests for deciding cases.' 60 The states that have
largely tied their equal protection to the federal guarantee only provide
such protection in cases61where there is federal court jurisprudence
stating that a right exists.'
Many state courts differ from the federal courts in how they
determine when a fundamental right exists.162 Some tests include that the
right is "central to freedom and representative democracy," "essential to
individual liberty," or "at the heart of the relationship between an
individual and the state.' ' 163 Other courts use an ad hoc basis. 164 Fifteen
states have held that state funded education is a fundamental right in
their constitutions. 165 Six states have held that a state funded education is
not a fundamental right, and six states have 66declined to answer the
question as to whether it is a fundamental right.'
The state courts that have found a fundamental right to education
base that finding on their state's education clause, the general
67
importance of education as expressed in Brown v. Board of Education
(just as in Plyler), the nexus between political participation and
education, the dissent in Rodriguez, and international human rights
documents. 168 Additionally, states such as North Dakota and West
Virginia have subjected education funding cases to a form of heightened

156.

See, e.g., McDuffy v. Sec'y of Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 519 (Mass.

1993); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997).
157.

Jeffrey, supranote 121, at 251.

158. Id. at 254.
159. Id. at 254-57.
160. Id. at 257-58.
161.

Id. at 260.

162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 269.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 270.

166.

Id. at 270-71.

167. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
168.

Jeffrey, supra note 121, at 271-74.
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scrutiny. 169 Six states have not applied heightened scrutiny to their
state's funding scheme, and all of these states except New Jersey
adopted the reasoning in Rodriguez.170 These states have upheld their
states' financing schemes. State courts are divided as to whether wealth
can be a suspect classification.1 71 Thus, even if state courts recognize a
fundamental right to education, because of the varied results stated
above, it is not clear whether application of equal protection analysis
would support a greater access to education or more equity in funding.
However, the situation in Plyler is different than education funding
cases in that the right to access education is denied completely unless
parents pay for the schooling. Thus, even if state courts do not recognize
education as a fundamental right and do not subject state funding
schemes to heightened scrutiny, they may still be inclined to apply a
heightened form of scrutiny because the complete inability to receive an
education is a much harsher result than receiving an inadequate one.
This inconsistent result among states is a good reason why there
should be a Federal Equal Protection right to access primary education
for the undocumented. Currently there are some states that educate more
undocumented children than others. If only some states recognize a right
to access education and others do not, then there may be a migration of
students and parents to those states that do recognize a right to access
education. Hence the burden might be shared inequitably. Furthermore,
with the existence of a Federal Equal Protection right to access
education for undocumented students, states that tie their equal
protection analysis to the federal one would follow suit.
B. Using Texas as an Example for State ConstitutionalEqual
ProtectionLitigation to Protect Undocumented Children
While the possibility of inconsistent results exists, using state
constitutions is one way to protect undocumented students' access to
education. Specifically, using the Texas state constitutional cases
concerning equal protection and education, the outcome in Plyler would
be likely preserved. The case of Richards
v. League of United Latin
17
American Citizens illustrates this point. 1
In Richards, Mexican-American United States citizens who lived in
the Mexican border area brought an equal protection challenge against

169.
170.
171.
172.

Id.
at 275.
Id.
at 278.
Seeid~at295-96.
868 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. 1993).
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the Texas system of higher education. 173 The Texas Supreme Court held
that the state's appropriation of fewer resources to the border area did
not violate the plaintiffs equal protection rights. 174 The trial court had
ruled that the higher education appropriation was unconstitutional via
the Texas Constitution.175 The trial court made the following findings:
(1) about 20% of Texans live in the border area, yet only about 10% of
the State funds spent for public universities are spent on public
universities in that region; (2) about 54% of the public university
students in the border area are Hispanic, as compared to 7% in the rest
of Texas; (3) the average public college or university student in the rest
of Texas must travel 45 miles from his or her home county to the
nearest public university offering a broad range of masters and
doctoral programs, but the average border area student must travel 225
miles; (4) only three of the approximately 590 doctoral programs in
Texas are at border area universities; (5) about 15% of the Hispanic
students from the border area who attend a Texas public university are
at a school with a broad range of masters and doctoral programs, as
compared to 61% of public university students in the rest of Texas; (6)
the physical plant value per capita and number of library volumes per
capita for public universities in the border area are approximately onehalf of the comparable figures for non-border universities; and (7)
these disparities exist against a history of discriminatory treatment of
Mexican Americans in the border area (with regard to education and
otherwise), and against176a present climate of economic disadvantage for
border area residents.

The State of Texas claimed such disparities in funding were a result
of differences in hiring salary for certain 77
faculty, different studentfaculty ratios, and different equipment needs.1
In many ways, the Texas courts have analyzed their state's equal
protection clause with a framework that is parallel to the federal
system.178 In this case, the trial court found that the state violated the

173. Id. at 308.
174. Id. at 314.
175. Id. at 316.
176. Id. at 309.

177. Id.
178. See id. at 310. The applicable Texas state constitutional provisions are as follows. Article
I § 3 of the state Equal Protection Clause in the Texas Constitution provides: "All free men, when
they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive
separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services." TEX. CONST. art.

1§3.
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Texas Constitution when it spent fewer resources on education in this
portion of the state, thus denying Mexican-Americans equal rights. 7 9
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the trial court's findings. 180 It did so
for four reasons. First, approximately half of the Mexican-American
population in the state lived outside the border area.' 8' Thus, it found
that the class of people was really defined based on geography and not
nationality. 182 For this reason, it found "territorial uniformity is not a
constitutional prerequisite. ' 83 Second, because the difference was only a
geographical disparity, the state only needed a legitimate basis for its
funding scheme, and its efficient location of such monies was one such
legitimate purpose. 84 Third, using a disparate impact analysis, the
plaintiff failed to document an intent to discriminate against MexicanAmericans. 85 The disproportionate impact was not enough to be
"overwhelming and unequivocal" in order to show a discriminatory
purpose.' 86 Finally, higher education was not a fundamental right under
the Texas Constitution.' 87 Thus, if the Texas Supreme Court were to be
presented with a case such as Plyler v. Doe today, it would likely reach
the same result as the United States Supreme Court reached in 1982.
Unlike Richards, a Plyler type of situation, where undocumented
aliens would be forced to pay out-of-district tuition, would have
implications across the entire state with respect to Mexican immigrants
and not just the border region. As a result, the class would be more
likely to be an "easily identifiable group[] singled out for different
treatment under the law and subject to prejudice in the community" and
' 88
therefore less likely to be based on solely "territorial uniformity."'
Further, the Texas Supreme Court noted "[the United States Supreme
Court] has recognized Mexican Americans as a separate class in various
equal protection contexts, and has treated discrimination against persons
of Mexican ancestry as equivalent to racial discrimination.' 89 However,
Article 1, section 3a provides: "Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged
because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin. This amendment is self-operative." TEX.
CONST. art. 1, § 3a.
179. Richards, 868 S.W.2d at 310.
180. Id. at 317.
181.

Id. at 311.

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

312.
314.
313-14.
314-17.
311,312 & n.6.
312 n.6 (internal citations omitted).
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Plyer states that undocumented aliens are not a suspect class.' 90 Thus, it
is unclear whether the Texas Supreme Court was referring to all persons
of Mexican descent, or legal permanent residents and citizens of
Mexican descent, when it used the words "Mexican Americans."' 9' If
the Texas Supreme Court found a distinction between the documented
and undocumented Mexican-Americans, it would likely not apply a
heightened form of scrutiny to the undocumented and thus there would
be no constitutional violation.
However, unlike Richards, a Plyler situation would involve
primary education and not higher education. The Texas courts have
stated that primary education is a fundamental right. 92 Their finding is
buttressed by the Texas Constitution's education clause that mandates
the state to provide an "efficient system of public free schools."', 93 Thus,
because a fundamental right exists, "the state action is subjected to strict
scrutiny" and would need to "serve a compelling government interest" in
order to be constitutional. 94 Denying education to undocumented alien
children would not be a compelling state interest because such children
would be more likely to be poor, commit crime, and engage in unhealthy
decisions. 95 Further, such an action would create the very caste system
that equal protection intends to abolish as found by the Plyler
majority. 196 For these reasons, the inability of undocumented children to
receive an education would constitute a violation of the equal protection
clause of the Texas Constitution.
Finally, Richards is distinct from Plyler in that it sought to request
a more equitable distribution of funds, whereas the plaintiffs in Plyler
only sought for the same right to access education as the other children
in the school district. 97 Thus, because the case does not involve a
complicated administrative decision of allocating funds, the Texas
Supreme Court may be more inclined to rule in favor of the plaintiffs.
The State of Texas may also argue that denying education to
undocumented children is a compelling interest because failure to do so
would be very costly to the state. However, such an argument ignores
190.
191.
192.
Ct. App.
193.

Plylerv. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,219 n.19.
Richards, 868 S.W.2d at 312 n.6.
Id. at 314-15 (quoting Stout v. Grand Prairie Indep. Sch. Dist., 733 S.W.2d 290, 294 (Tex.
1987).
TEX. CONST. art. V11, § 1.

194. Richards,868 S.W.2d at 311.
195. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 238 (Powell, J., concurring) ("I agree with the Court that their children
should not be left on the streets uneducated.").
196. Id. at 218-19.
197. Compareid. at 205-06 with Richards, 868 S.W.2d at 308.
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the benefit the residents of the state receive in the form of cheap labor of
parents, as well other benefits that education
the undocumented students'
198
provides for society.
Finally, if the Texas Supreme Court were to hold that
undocumented students have a right to access primary education, it
would be overruling a Texas Court of Appeals decision, Hernandez v.
Houston Independent School District. 99 In that 1977 case, the Texas
Court of Appeals, Third District, upheld the state and federal
constitutionality of a statute that denied using public funds to educate
undocumented children. 20 0 The court of appeals failed to find that
education was a fundamental right via Rodriguez or that undocumented
aliens were a suspect class. 20 1 Thus, that statute was rationally related to
the improvement of education and was constitutional.20 2 Plyler would
have overruled the federal constitutionality issue involved in this case.20 3
However, the court of appeals' state equal protection conclusion has
never been overruled.20 4
V.

CONCLUSION

The continued vitality of Plyler v. Doe as a high water mark for
immigrants' rights jurisprudence is a fact. Notwithstanding this fact,
alternative bases for Plyler's objective of securing the right to access
education should be explored. While economic rights are not favored
under the Federal Constitution, traditional rights, such as the right to
parent and guide a child's education have been ruled on by the United
States Supreme Court in the past. Such a right to parent may even be a
way to allow a right to access education. The right to direct a child's
education can be implemented through participation with local school
boards. Undocumented parents could also be given the ability to
influence this body through representation or voting.
Additionally, arguments under the education clauses and equal
protection clauses of state constitutions should be explored also as
198. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 228-29.
199. 558 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977).
200. Id. at 122-23.
201. Id. at 122-24.
202. Id. at 124-25.
203. See Phillip J. Cooper, Plyler at the Core: Understandingthe Proposition 187 Challenge,
17 CHICANO-LATINO L. REv. 64, 70 n.25 (1995) ("A state case was decided while the Doe v. Plyler
suit was pending but there was no attempt to challenge the federal action on that ground.").
204. Cf Kirby v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 761 S.W.2d 859, 861 n.4 (Tex. App. 1988)
("The precise holding in Hernandez, that the state need not provide a tuition-free education to
illegal alien children, was overruled by Plyler.").
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alternatives for undocumented children to attend primary school. The
education clauses in many constitutions such as Texas support the
proposition that the right to access primary education is a fundamental
right. Therefore, any attempt to deny education should be evaluated
under a heightened form of scrutiny. By using alternative arguments to
preserve the objective of Plyler, its vitality can be preserved for future
generations of undocumented students.
Plyler represented a narrow view of immigration law meeting
education by focusing only on the right of children to attend school.2 °5 A
more expansive view would integrate the parental experience with
modem notions of educating children. Rather than undocumented aliens
becoming isolated from the greater American society, this view would
seek their participation and personal responsibility in creating a better
country. As undocumented parents become more numerous, their
participation will be valuable in ensuring that the needs of all students
are met. If they are participating in school board elections and PTA
meetings, rather than watching from the sidelines, their neighbors would
be more likely to see them as partners in achieving better educational
outcomes.

205. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol36/iss4/4

28

